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In this paper, I would like to pursue a comment made by Thomas Nagel 
in his book, The Possibility of Altruism, concerning a possible problem with 
consistency in Kant's theory of moral motivation. 1 In general, Nagel 
applauds Kant's theory of moral motivation. He thinks that in the history of 
Ethics Kant has done the most to present a description of moral motivation 
which is not dependent on any desires or feelings prior to or outside of the 
recognition of a moral obligation itself. Kant attempts to "put ethical 
principles themselves at the absolute source of our moral conduct" (PA, 11); 
he denies that any motivational influence is "already present among the 
conditions of any moral requirement" (PA, 13); and he insists that "there are 
reasons for actions which are specifically moral" (PA, 13). All this meets 
with Nagel's approval, and Nagel himself attempts to provide a "defense" 
for such an "internalist" theory. 2 What is troubling for Nagel is that Kant 
also allows for the phenomenon of Achtung, or moral feeling in the form of 
respect for the moral law. Nagel's comment is the following: "It seems 
possible that Kant's postulation of moral interest as the motivating impulse 
for phenomenal moral behavior compromised the effort [to establish moral 
reasons as themselves the independent source of moral motivation]" (PA, 
11). 
Nagel's worry is shared by others. Mark Timmons, for instance, argues 
that Kant's positing of a mysterious, a priori feeling (Achtung) was indeed 
superfluous and merely symptomatic of his unreflective Aristotelian 
heritage, and that if Kant could have liberated himself from that influence, 
he would have provided an account of morality similar to Nagel 's . 3 
Timmons thus suggests that Kant did in fact "compromise the effort" to give 
an account of ethics which shows that reason itself is the source of moral 
motivation. E. J. Bond, who rejects Nagel's rational internalism, states: "But 
even Kant recognized that some motivational factor was necessary to 
1 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970). Hereafter, referred to in the text as PA. 
2 Nagel defines internalism as the view that moral motivation is "tied to the 
truth, or meaning, of ethical propositions themselves." Weak internalist 
theories (such as emotivism) tie motivation to the meaning of ethical 
propositions; Nagel seeks to develop a stronger internalist theory which ties 
the motivation to their "/n///i"--meaning that once one recognizes a moral 
obligation, one is motivated by it, independently of whatever wants, desires 
or feelings the agent might be experiencing (PA, 7-8). 
3 Mark Timmons, "Kant and the Possibility of Moral Motivation," Southern 
journal of Philosophy 23 No. 3 (1985): 377-398. 
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account for being moved to act on moral grounds, beyond the mere 
recognition of the law, and he called that "reverence" or "respect" for the 
law."4 
The problem, then, is this: Does Kant hold that the recognition of a 
moral obligation itself provides the motivation to act morally, or does he 
believe that in addition to this recognition, moral feeling is required as a 
motivational impetus for moral action? Is it possible that reason could give 
a moral command and yet fail to motivate, because of the lack of the 
experience of moral feeling? More to the point: Is reason independently 
motivating or is it not? 
These questions demand a clarification of the role of moral feeling in 
Kant's theory of moral motivation. Admittedly, as I will show, there are 
grounds for the confusion in the interpretation of its role in Kant. However, 
I will argue that Kant's doctrine on moral feeling can be interpreted so that it 
in no way contradicts nor "compromises" his main tenet that reason can 
independently motivate moral action. Since, for Nagel, (rational) 
internalism guarantees motivation upon the recognition of a moral 
obligation, I argue that Kant can be interpreted in such a way as to leave his 
rational internalism uncompromised. 
In his chapter on the "Incentives of Pure Practical Reason" in the Second 
Critique, Kant gives his most concentrated discussion of the phenomenon of 
moral feeling. Kant begins this section with his oft-repeated claim that 
actions have moral worth only when the will is determined by the moral law 
itself, independently of any other motivating influence. Actions which are 
merely done in conformity with the moral law, but not for the sake of the 
moral law, have "legality" but not "morality"; they are "morally good in letter 
but not in spirit (in intention)" (CPrR, p. 74; 75n). The only incentive to truly 
"moral" actions "can never be anything other than the moral law" (CPrR, 74). 
If this is true, then why does Kant go on to speak of moral feeling, and how 
are we to understand its role (if it has one) in moral motivation? 
The discussion of moral feeling is undertaken, not in order to explain 
how the moral law "determines the will," that is, how it functions as a 
motivating influence. For the problem of how the moral law motivates is the 
problem of freedom, which cannot be explained through reason. So Kant 
says that "nothing remains" but to explain carefully "in what way the moral 
law becomes an incentive" (CPrR, 75). That is, nothing remains but to 
describe the "subjective effects" of the motivating influence of the moral law 
on the human mind. By "subjective effects" Kant does not mean effects 
which vary between individuals according to their respective desires, but 
simply effects of the objective moral law which are experienced on the part 
of the human subject because of their human constitution. The discussion of 
moral feeling is presented as a phenomenologica! description of the manner 
human moral agents are affected by the moral law. 
4 E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983)11. 
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The effects of the moral law on the human mind are ubiquitously 
experienced, but they can also be known a priori. They can be known a 
priori given the analysis of human beings as having both a sensuous nature 
determining inclinations, and a rational nature, which issues moral 
commands. To say that these effects can be known a priori means that these 
subjective effects are necessary. The necessary, a priori effects of the moral 
law on the human mind are both positive and negative. 
In a human being, the commands of reason will necessarily conflict (at 
some time or other) with the inclinations of its sensuous nature. The 
freedom to choose to act morally independently of inclinations, or even 
contrary to inclinations must result in pain. Pain is the "thwarting" of our 
inclinations. Our selfish concerns are "humiliated" in the face of the moral 
law; the moral law "checks" our self-conceit, preventing it from fully 
determining our actions (CPrR, 74; 75). Kant calls the experience of 
humiliation and the "striking-down" of self-love and conceit the "negative 
subjective effects" of the incentive of the moral law. These negative effects 
are pathological in nature, meaning that they are derived from our sensuous 
nature. 
The "positive subjective effect" of the moral law is respect for the moral 
law. Moral feeling can only be respect for moral law as dictated by reason. 
It can also be known a priori, for the moral law can humiliate only if it exists 
as an object of respect. While Kant speaks of the feeling of respect as being 
"awakened" by the negative effects of pain, he also presents the feelings of 
pain and the feeling of respect as simultaneous, both sides of the same coin 
(CPrR, 77; 78). Even if the feeling of pain temporally precedes the feeling of 
respect, the feeling of respect is primary in the sense that there can be no 
painful humiliation without an object of respect. Kant stipulates that this 
feeling of respect does not have an "empirical origin," but rather is produced 
entirely by an "intellectual cause" (CPrR, 76). He states: "This particular 
feeling cannot be said to be pathologically effected; rather, it is practically 
effected." With this feeling of respect, we become aware of our autonomy, or 
of our "supersensuous" existence—in short, we become aware of our intrinsic 
worth. We become aware of our "supersensuous" nature in the 
consciousness of our independence from natural influences and of our 
freedom to act according to universal laws which are self-imposed. This is 
the consciousness of our distinctive natures as rational beings. It is the 
consciousness of the sublimity of our natures (CPrR, 91). Kant goes as far as 
to allow a sense of pleasure in the overcoming of our inclinations in the 
fulfillment of our duty. Since we are sensual beings, he says that it must be 
possible for the moral law to exercise itself in this w a y . s 
The necessary effects of the moral law on the human mind do not apply 
to the Divine will. In fact, Kant denies that the moral law is an incentive for 
5 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans., Lewis 
White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1959) 77. (Hereafter, 
referred to in the text as F). 
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the Divine will (CPrR, 74). The moral law is an incentive only for beings for 
whom reason does not automatically and conclusively determine the will. 
The Divine or holy will experiences no negative effects of pain or 
humiliation because it has no sensuous nature conflicting with reason. 
Reason would be motivating for the holy will without hindrance and 
without pain. Neither does it experience a feeling of respect for the moral 
law. The feeling of respect, while caused by pure practical reason, requires a 
dual (sensuous) nature. 
The most significant way in which Kant's concept of moral feeling 
differs from that of his predecessor's is that it is rationally induced. The 
feeling of respect for the moral law, while requiring a sensuous nature, is 
caused by the rational recognition of a moral obligation. It is "produced 
solely by reason" (CPrR, 79). Kant has "redefined" the whole concept of 
moral feeling by, in his mind, correcting for the errors of other moral 
theorists. 
Let's turn now to the suggestion that Kant's inclusion of a discussion of 
moral feeling compromises his rational internalism by contradicting the 
claim that pure practical reason can, by itself, motivate us to act morally. 
Suppose we interpret Kant as Nagel, Timmons, and Bond have done, as 
saying that it is the respect for the moral law, rather than reason itself, which 
motivates moral action. 
The interpretation jars with some claims made by Kant to the contrary. 
Properly speaking, Kant seems to say, it is not respect which motivates 
moral action; it is rather reason in the form of the moral law which 
motivates. He states: "the moral incentive of the human will, can never be 
anything other than the moral law: (CPrR, 74). He explicitly denies this role 
to respect: "Thus respect for the law is not the incentive to morality" (CPrR, 
78). Kant calls the pure moral law the only "genuine incentive" (CPrR, 91). f a 
He speaks of the law as determining the will directly (CPrR, 81). These 
claims are consistent with those made in his earlier Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant speaks of the "immediate determination of 
the will by the [moral] law" and where he says that the influence of the 
moral law is "by way of reason alone" (F, 19; 28). 
However, the matter is not settled so easily, as other passages seem to 
cast moral feeling as a moral motivator. Kant also refers to respect for the 
pure moral law (which is moral feeling) as the "sole and undoubted moral 
incentive" (CPrR, 81). Further, he does speak of respect for the moral law 
"promoting" the influence of the moral law, and of the removing of the 
h Note that the reference to the moral law as an incentive diverges from 
Kant's language in the Foundations. There, incentives are thought of as being 
determined by purely subjective concerns: "The subjective ground of desire 
is the incentive, while the objective ground of volition is the motive" (l\ 45). 
In the Second Critique, Kant allows that objective grounds can also serve as 
incentives. See Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's "Crilitpie of 
Practical Reason" (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, I960) 216. 
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obstacles of inclination in humiliation (through respect) as a "positive 
assistance" to the causality of the moral law (CPrR, 78). 
If Kant is not himself confused about the role of moral feeling in moral 
motivation, it must certainly be admitted that his presentation of its role is 
confused. I do not believe that Kant is fundamentally confused, even though 
on one page he claims that it is the moral law which is the incentive to 
morality, and on the next, respect for the moral law. The key passage for the 
resolution of this difficulty is the continuation of one previously quoted: 
'Thus respect for the law is not the incentive to morality; it is morality itself, 
regarded subjectively as an incentive" (CPrR, 78). The recognition of the 
moral law in a categorical command is the incentive to morality, but the 
incentive to morality is experienced by the human subject as respect for the 
law. To interpret Kant as saying that it is respect for the moral law, rather 
than the moral law itself, which motivates, is to fail to understand the close 
connection between the two. Moral feeling (respect) issues from no other 
source than the moral law. Using Kantian language, while the moral law is 
the "formal determining ground of action through pure practical reason," the 
moral law is also a "subjective determining ground of action" and appears, in 
a being with both a rational and a sensual nature, as respect for the moral 
law. There is no problem or inconsistency in thinking of respect for the 
moral law as the moral incentive, as long as one remembers that respect is 
"produced solely by reason" (CPrR, 79). The feeling of respect, for Kant, is 
the result of the already motivating power of reason. It refers to the way we 
experience the moral law as motivating. The feeling of respect is, as it were, 
the cpiphenomcnon of moral motivation. 7 
When Kant speaks of respect for the moral law as the "sole and 
undoubted moral incentive" he is stressing (going back to the idea 
introduced at the beginning of the section on the Incentives) that actions 
which have moral worth are done out of respect for the moral law, and not 
because of any other motivating influence. Actions motivated by self-
interest or even sympathy are not, for him, truly moral actions. Since respect 
is a "singular" or unique feeling, being pure, nonsensuous, issuing only from 
reason, we may refer to respect as the moral incentive. 
Kant's "rational internalism" is not compromised because Kant never 
allows that respect for the moral law or moral feeling, rather than reason, 
motivates moral action. Nor does he allow that we can be cognizant of a 
moral obligation and fail to experience respect. Respect can be regarded as 
an incentive, only because it issues from the dictates of reason in moral law. 
Since the positive and negative effects of the moral law are necessary (they 
can be known apriori) there is nothing contingent about the motivating 
influence of reason. 8 Therefore, moral motivation is "guaranteed" by the 
recognition of a moral command. Kant neither allows for the recognition of 
7 This term was suggested to me by an anonymous reader. 
K Whether or not the moral action is accomplished is, however, a contingent 
matter. 
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a moral command without the response of respect, nor the phenomenon of 
moral feeling without the issuance of a moral command. Moral feeling is 
not thought of as the basis of, or requirement for, moral commands. Kant 
states: "no kind of feeling; [even] under the name of a practical or moral 
feeling, may be assumed as prior to the moral law and as its basis" (CPrR, 
77). So, like Nagel, Kant is giving an analysis of moral motivation such that 
there are "specifically moral" reasons for action; such that morality is not 
derived from or dependent on feelings; and such that moral principles are 
the "absolute source" of moral conduct. What is at issue in Nagel's 
internalism is that moral commands motivate unconditionally, without any 
dependence on a moral agent's wants, desires, or feelings, and that ethical 
principles are underived. Categorical commands are not derived from 
moral feeling, but visa versa. We should not even think of respect as an 
"intermediary" motivator, such that first the moral law causes respect, and 
then respect causes the morally appropriate action, by "determining the 
will." This interpretation would contradict Kant's stipulation that the moral 
law determines the will "immediately." 
In conclusion, Kant never retracts his claim that recognition through 
reason of a moral obligation provides all the motivation required to act 
morally. For him, no additional motivational factor is required. Bond is 
mistaken in interpreting him as suggesting that "some motivational factor 
beyond the recognition of the law" is required to explain moral behavior. 
Kant only says that, given a human being, the efficacy of reason is 
necessarily experienced in the moral feeling of respect. Reason can 
"independently" motivate moral activity in the sense that it does not depend 
on any prior influence. Hence, Kant's internalism is left uncompromised. 
Kant obviously must have felt that his ethical works would have been 
incomplete without a discussion of the moral feeling of respect, since he 
introduces the notion in his Foundations and develops the notion so 
extensively in the more mature Second Critique. The discussion would not, 
however, have been incomplete in the sense that without moral feeling there 
would be no incentive for morality; but only in the sense that its treatment of 
the psychology of morality would have been incomplete. There would have 
been no account of the subjective effects of the already motivating influence 
of reason in the form of the moral law. Kant's ethical works should not be 
faulted for including the discussion of the moral feeling of respect, for its 
inclusion adds to the richness of the account and coheres with important 
elements of our moral experience. 
